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JOHN J. O'BRIEN* AND JAMES A. THOMPSON, JR.** 
§18.1. Introduction. The Survey year was not marked by any rad-
ical alterations of environmental programs in Massachusetts. Rather, it 
was notable for the extent to which the state agencies charged with 
the responsibility for administering state environmental programs 
adapted to the new administrative configurations effected by the 
"reorganization" of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs 
("EOEA")1 and attempted to fulfill their mandates despite budget par-
ing. During the Survey year the state budget was cut radically. The 
budget for the EOEA and its component agencies, which was 
$82,010,000 in fiscal year 1975,2 was reduced to $77,883,000 for fiscal 
year 1976,3 and may be reduced further if the Legislature pares the 
Governor's recommendation for a $77,882,000 EOEA budget for 
fiscal year 1977.4 Massachusetts practitioners who must deal with 
agencies within the EOEA should consider the probable effect of 
thes~ budget reductions upon the ability of state agencies to provide 
services. 
Changes in environmental law during the Survey year occurred in 
the established areas of environmental impact review and air pollution 
control. In addition, the Commonwealth began to evaluate its existing 
programs in the areas of pesticide regulation and drinking water qual-
ity with a view towards implementing federal statutes in those areas. 
§18.2. Environmental Impact Review: Introduction. Since 1970, 
when the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")1 became effec-
*jOHN J. O'BRIEN is Associate Counsel to the Division of Water Pollution Control of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
**jAMES A. THOMPSON. JR. is Assistant Regional Counsel, Region I, United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency. 
§ 18.1. 1 The "reorganization" of the EOEA was effected by Acts of 197 4, c. 806, 
and Acts of 197 5, c. 706. 
2 See Acts of 1974, c. 431, c. 698, & c. 855; Acts of 1975, c. 112 & c. 327. 
3 See Acts of 1975, c. 404, c. 530, c. 597, & c. 684. 
4 See H. I (1976). 
§18.2. 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). NEPA was amended by Pub. L. No. 94-83, 
89 Stat. 424 (Aug. 9, 1975). See§ 18.3 infra. 
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tive, environmental impact review has become an important feature of 
environmental law. NEPA requires that all federal agencies proposing 
action that might significantly affect the quality of the human envi-
ronment include an environmental impact statement in their reports 
or recommendations.2 In addition, many states have formulated en-
vironmental impact review systems based on NEPA.3 In 1972, the 
Massachusetts Legislature joined this trend and, through the enact-
ment of the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act ("MEPA"),4 
created an environmental impact review system applicable to state 
government. MEPA requires, first, that state agencies and authorities 
consider the environmental impact of their programs and strive to 
minimize damage to the environment. 5 MEPA also mandates that, be-
fore an agency undertakes any project that might cause significant 
damage to the environment, it prepare a formal document-termed 
an environmental impact report-defining the effect on the environ-
ment of that project. 6 
MEPA charges the Secretary of Environmental Affairs with chief 
administrative responsibility in the administration of the state en-
vironmental impact review program by vesting the Secretary with au-
thority to comment on the adequacy of the environmental impact re-
ports and to supervise the development of the re~ulations bv which 
the implementation of the statute is to be facilitated. Although MEPA 
continues to require a broad scope of review in environmental impact 
statements for projects directly undertaken by state agencies through 
the expenditure of state funds, the statute was amended in 1974 to 
narrow the scope for those projects in which a state agency's involve-
ment arises less directly through, for example, a licensing or regula-
tory function. 8 
During the Survey year, a number of developments, state and fed-
eral, administrative, judicial and legislative, have altered the environ-
mental impact review programs applicable in the Commonwealth. On 
the federal level, Congress amended NEPA to modify the procedural 
2 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2}(C) (1970). For a discussion of NEPA, the litigation that has 
taken place thereunder, and its effects on the federal bureaucracy, see Anderson, The 
National Environmental Policy Act, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238-419 (Env. Law lnst. 
1974). 
3 See O'Brien and Miller, Environmental Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW § 18.6, at 
456 n.l. 
4 G.L. c. 30, §§ 61, 62. For discussions of MEPA see Miller, Environmental Law, 1972 
ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§§ 21.8-.10, at 605-12; O'Brien and Deland, Environmental Law, 
1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 6.8, at 178-88; and O'Brien and Miller, Environmental 
Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§§ 18.2-.6, at 435-58. 
5 G.L. c. 30, § 61. 
6 /d. § 62. 
7 /d. 
8 /d. § 62, as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 257, § 1. See O'Brien and Miller, 
Environmental Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 18.3, at 437. 
2
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requirements to be followed by federal agencies in undertaking en-
vironmental impact review of certain federal actions. 9 The regulatory 
scheme under which MEPA is to be implemented has been changed 
slightly as a result of rulemaking by the Secretary of Environmental 
Affairs. 1 0 Unlike its federal model, NEPA, the Massachusetts En-
vironmental Policy Act has not been subjected to extensive judicial 
scrutiny. In Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port 
Authority, 11 the Supreme Judicial Court made its first definitive ruling 
on the enforceability of MEPA. 12 Finally, as a result of the controversy 
underlying the 1974 amendment to MEPA, the Legislature created a 
special commission to study the efficacy of that statute; during the 
Survey year, the commission produced a First Interim Report. 13 
§18.3. NEPA Amendment: Environmental Impact Statements 
Prepared by State Agencies. In 1975, Congress amended NEPA to 
permit federal agencies to use an environmental impact statement 
("EIS") prepared by a state agency to satisfy NEPA obligations in cer-
tain instances. 1 Under this amendment, a federal agency may satisfy 
NEPA with respect to programs in which it has a relatively minor sub-
stantive role-through the award of federal grants to state agencies 
having statewide jurisdiction-provided that (1) the federal agency 
"furnishes guidance and participates in" the preparation of the EIS by 
the state agency and (2) the federal agency "independently evaluates" 
each EIS prior to approving and adopting it. 2 Nonetheless, where a 
federal agency has thus delegated to a state agency the responsibility 
for preparing an EIS for a particular project that may have significant 
impacts on land managed by another state or federal agency and 
where that agency has filed comments disagreeing with the extent and 
magnitude of the impacts, the sponsoring federal agency must pre-
pare and incorporate into the EIS a written· assessment of the en-
vironmental impacts and the differing views thereon. 3 Although the 
amendment thus allows federal agencies to delegate responsibilities 
for the preparation of certain impact statements, it specifically pro-
vides that the federal agencies shall remain responsible for their 
"scope, objectivity, and content," as well as for compliance with all 
other provisions of NEP A. 4 
9 § 18.3 infra. 
10 § 18.4 infra. 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 285, 323 N.E.2d 329, 7 E.R.C. 1759, 5 E.L.R. 20200. 
12 § 18.5 infra. 
13 § 18.6 infra. 
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This amendment was precipitated by the confusion resulting from 
the decision of the Second C1rcuit in Conservation Society v. Secretary. 5 
In Conservation Society, the court held that the Federal Highway Works 
Administration ("FHW A") could not delegate to the Vermont highway 
department the responsibility for preparing an EIS for a federally 
funded highway to be built in that state.6 The court reasoned that the 
federal agency was more likely to engage in a dispassionate review of 
the benefits of the proposed program and its costs to the 
environment. 7 
The Conservation Society decision had wide impact since several fed-
eral agencies, including the FHW A, had relied upon a divergence in 
case law8 and upon language in regulations promulgated by the 
Council on Environmental Quality9 as authorizing them to delegate 
the responsibility of preparing an EIS to the state agency primarily 
involved in the program. In reaction to the Conservation Society 
decision, the FHWA suspended highway projects in New York, Ver-
mont, and Connecticut, the three Second Circuit states. 10 The impact 
of Conservation Society appeared likely to become more widespread as, 
shortly after it was handed down, it was followed in two federal court 
decisions rendered elsewhere in the country.U 
In response, Congress amended NEPA to formulate a special pro-
cedure for the delegation of EIS responsibility to the states for those 
programs where federal agencies have a minor role. 12 Although this 
1975 amendment was the first direct modification of NEPA, it was not 
the first instance in which the scope of that statute has been delimited 
by Congressional action. Several special exemptions have been made, 
indirectly by amendments to or provisions in other statutes, to exempt 
certain activities from the applicability of NEPA. For example, certain 
environmental regulatory functions exercised by the EPA in the areas 
of air13 and water14 pollution control have been exempted from 
5 508 F.2d 927, 7 E.R.C. 1236, 5 E.L.R. 20068 (2d Cir. 1974). 
6 /d. at 931, 7 E.R.C. at 1239, 5 E.L.R. at 20070. 
7 Id. 
8 For a discussion of the case law on this point see Anderson, The National Environ-
mental Policy Act, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 366-72 (Env. Law lnst. 1974). 
9 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(c) (1975). Under NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality is 
given a role in supervising the implementation of NEPA similar to that given the Sec-
retary of Environmental Affairs under MEPA. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970) 
with G.L. c. 30, § 62. 
10 S. REP. No. 152, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 
1797, 1800. 
11 Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 778-79, 7 E.R.C. 2046, 2054-55, 5 E.L.R. 20354, 
20359 (7th Cir. 1975); Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105, 121, 
5 E.L.R. 20311,20317 (D.N.H. 1975). 
12 See generally S. REP. No. 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. ConE CoNG. & 
An. NEws 1797-1816. 
13 Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act ("ESECA") § 7, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 793 (Supp. 1976). 
14 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 551(c), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1371(c) (Supp. II, 1972). 
4
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NEPA. Special projects or programs have also been exempted from 
the coverage of NEPA where Congress has determined that it would 
be impractical or inexpedient to hold the federal agencies administer-
ing these projects or programs to the requirements of full NEPA en-
vironmental impact review} 5 One notable exemption from NEPA is 
that created for "community development block grants" made by the 
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to 
local communities pursuant to the Housing and Community De-
velopment Act of 1974.16 That statute provides that HUD may ex-
empt itself from responsibility for preparing an EIS for its award of 
block grant funds to a local community by conditioning the award 
upon the recipient's agreement to comply with NEPA, to assume the 
status of a "responsible Federal official" under NEPA, and to consent 
"to accept the jurisdiction of the Federal courts for the purposes of 
enforcement of [such] responsibilities as such an official."17 
§18.4. MEPA Regulations: Executive Office of Environmental 
Affairs: Revised Guideline Regulations. Under MEPA, compliance 
with its environmental impact report requirements is tv be facilitated 
by the promulgation by each executive office of rules and regulations 
applicable to each of its constituent state agencies. 1 MEPA further 
provides that these various executive office regulations are to be ap-
proved by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs. 2 Pursuant to this 
requirement, the Secretary, in June, 1973, adopted3 and in October, 
1973, amended4 "guideline regulations" to serve both as models for 
the MEP A regulations to be adopted by each executive office and to 
serve as the MEPA procedures to be used by state agencies until 
MEP A regulations have been adopted by the appropriate executive 
office. 5 In response to the 197 4 amendment of MEPA, 6 the Secretary 
15 E.g., the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authori-
zation Act § 203(d), 43 U.S.C. § 1652(d) (Supp. IV, 1974); and actions taken by the 
Federal Power Commission with regard to the issuance of an electric energy transmis-
sion facility permit for a specific site' on the United States-Canada border. ESECA 
§ 7(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 793(d) (Supp. 1976). 
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). 
17 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 104(h), 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h) 
(Supp. IV, 1974). For a discussion of the NEPA implications of a federal agency activity 
in a context analogous to that of the HUD block grant program see Note, The Applica-
tion of Federal Environmental Standards to the General Revenue Sharing Program: NEPA and 
Unrestricted Federal Grants, 60 VA. L. REV. 114 (1974). 
§18.4. 1 G.L. c. 30, § 62. 
2 I d. Curiously, this provision in MEPA does not apply to authorities of political sub-
divisions, although these entities are subject to the substantive requirements of MEPA. 
3 Regulations to Create a Uniform System for the Preparation of Environmental Im-
pact Reports, filed on June 29, 1973. 
4 Amendments to Regulations to Create a Uniform System for the Preparation of En-
vironmental Impact Reports, filed on October 15, 1973. 
5 The Procedures described by the regulations cited in notes 3 and 4 supra are de-
scribed in O'Brien and Deland, Environmental Law, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 6.8, at 
178-88. 
8 Acts of 1974, c. 257, § 1. 
5
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adopted additional "guideline regulations" 7 detailing MEPA proce-
dures reflecting the differing scopes of environmental impact analysis 
to be accorded "state agency projects" and "private projects."8 By the 
start of the Survey year, most executive offices had adopted regula-
tions specifying MEPA procedures.9 
As of October, 1975, the Secretary had revised the guideline regu-
lations applicable to both private projects and state agency projects. 10 
These new guidelines contain new assessment forms applicable to 
state agency projects and private projects, 11 establish categorical ex-
emptions applicable to the agencies within the EOEA,12 and effect 
some other minor technical modifications to standard MEPA proce-
dures. 
Although none of this rulemaking effects any profound change in 
the administration of MEP A, the Massachusetts practitioner should 
keep in mind that the MEPA system is subject to change and modifi-
cation as experience is gained in its administration, as state agencies 
operate within the constraints of fiscal and administrative resources, 
and as the underlying statutes are modified. 
§18.5. MEPA Enforcement: Massport II. The first decisive rul-
ing supporting enforcement of MEPA was made in Secretary of En-
vironmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Authority 1 ("Massport II"), 2 a de-
7 Regulations to Implement c. 30, § 62, as amended by c. 257 of the Acts of 1974, filed 
on July 2, 1974. 
8 'For a description of the distinction between state agency projects and private proj-
ects see O'Brien and Miller, Environmental Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW§ 18.3, at 
437-42. 
9 See id. § 18.4, at 442-49. 
10 This revision was effected by way of three rulemakings. On December 31, 1974, 
the Secretary adopted "Regulations Governing the Preparation of Environmental Im-
pact Reports," which supplanted the two prior sets of guideline regulations. On June 
30, 1975, the Secretary, by emergency rulemaking, adopted regulations that amended 
those parts of the December, 1974, regulations applicable to agencies within the EOEA 
to reflect the new agency titles and administrative configurations effected by the reor-
ganization of that executive office. These interim rules were replaced by regulations, ti-
tled "Amendments to Regulations Governing the Preparation of Environmental Impact 
Reports," adopted by the Secretary in September, 1975. As of this writing, these Sep-
tember, 1975 regulations are the only EOEA regulations under MEPA in force and ef-
fect. 
11 The initial evaluation of state agency projects is to be done by way of an Environ-
mental Assessment Form ("EAF"); private projects are to be evaluated by use of a Lim-
ited Environmental Assessment Form ("LEAF"). The EAF and LEAF are attached as 
Appendices A to Parts One and Two of the September, 1975 regulations respectively. 
In addition to the rulemaking described in note 10 sufrra, the Secretary, in March, 
1975, published an "Environmental Assessment Form Manual" to facilitate the uniform 
use of the EAF and LEAF. 
12 Amendments to Regulations Governing the Preparation of Environmental Impact 
Reports, filed September 29, 1975, Appendix C to Part One. 
§18.5. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 285, 323 N.E.2d 329, 7 E.R.C. 1759, 5 E.L.R. 20200. 
2 Coincidentally, Massport has been defendant in the two actions in which MEPA 
had been before the Supreme Judicial Court within the context of adversary 'litigation. 
The decision in the first case was rendered in 1974, City of Boston v. Massachusetts 
Port Authority, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 308 N.E.2d 488, 6 E.R.C. 1337, 4 E.L.R. 
6
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cision rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court on February 5, 1975. 
The defendant Massachusetts Port Authority ("Massport"),3 was 
charged with failure to comply with MEPA upon undertaking a proj-
ect to extend two existing runways and to construct a third in the 
Bird Island Flats portion of Massport's Logan Airport facility. 4 On 
appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that since the runways proj-
ect had not "commenced" until after the date when MEPA's en-
vironmental impact report ("EIR") requirements were effective,5 
Massport was required to prepare an EIR before proceeding with the 
runways project. 6 
Between 1959 and 1974, Massport had undertaken a variety of ac-
tions related generally to the development of airport facilities in the 
Bird Island Flats. In this period, Massport had acquired title to the 
Flats, had received federal approval of the airport development plan, 
had undertaken basic site preparation, and had authorized bond is-
sues to secure financing for the development of the Flats. 7 Nonethe-
less, as of July 1, 1973, the date when MEPA became fully effective, 
Massport had not begun construction of the runways ptoject. In May, 
1974, Massport finally executed a contract for the actual construction 
of the runways project. 8 The City of Boston and the Secretary of En-
vironmental Affairs and the Secretary of Transportation and Con-
struction brought suit against Massport and its contractor alleging vio-
lations of MEPA and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.9 The 
superior court granted preliminary injunctive relief and enjoined 
further construction of the project pending compliance by Massport 
with MEPA. 10 
In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Judicial Court made find-
ings regarding three issues presented by Massport's appeal. The 
Court found: (1) that the runways project had not commenced prior 
20314. Because of the limited case law under MEPA and the close nexus between the 
holdings in these 1974 and 1975 decisions, they are refered to herein as Massport I and 
Massport II respectively. 
3 Massport has frequently been charged with failure to comply with environmental 
statutes. E.g., City of Boston v. Brinegar, 512 F.2d 319, 6 E.R.C. 1961, 5 E.L.R. 20241 
(1st Cir. 1975); City of Boston v.· Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 698, 5 E.L.R. 20502 (D. Mass. 
1975). 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 285-86, 323 N.E.2d at 331, 7 E.R.C. at 1759-60, 5 E.L.R. at 
20200. The two companion state court actions were brought by the City of Boston and 
by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs and the Secretary of Transportation and 
Construction . 
• 
5 G.L. c. 30, § 62, which imposes this EIR requirement, became effective on July 1, 
1973. G.L. c. 30, § 61, the other MEPA section, was made effective on December 31, 
1972. Acts of 1972, c. 781, § 3. 
6 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 297-98, 323 N.E.2d at 335, 7 E.R.C. at 1762, 5 E.L.R. at 
20201-02. 
7 /d. at 287-93, 323 N.E.2d at 331-33, 7 E.R.C. at 1760-61, 5 E.L.R. at 20200-01. 
8 !d. at 292, 323 N.E.2d at 333, 7 E.R.C. at 1761, 5 E.L.R. at 20201. 
J /d. at 285-86, 323 N.E.2d at 331, 7 E.R.C. at 1759-60, 5 E.L.R. at 20200. 
10 !d. at 286, 323 N .E.2d at 331, 7 E.R.C. at 1760, 5 E.L.R. at 20200. 
7
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to the date when MEPA's EIR requirements were effective; 11 (2) that 
since the project could cause damage to the environment an EIR 
would be required; 12 and (3) that a determination of whether Mass-
port had complied with MEPA could be made only on the basis of an 
EIR. 13 The Court's opinion is noteworthy for its detailed examination 
of the bases for these rulings. 
Commencement of the project. For purposes of establishing what proj-
ects had "commenced" prior to July 1, 1973, and thus would not re-
quire an EIR under section 62 of chapter 30 of the General Laws, the 
EOEA has defined as "commenced" those projects for which the state 
agency "has undertaken a continuous program of action or construc-
tion or has entered into a binding agreement or other obligation to 
undertake and complete a continuous program of action or 
construction."14 Massport argued that the runways project had com-
menced in 1969 when it had contracted for the construction of a 
drainage system for an emplacement of a rock dike around the en-
tire 234-acre Flats. On the basis of this activity, Massport asserted that 
the project did not fall under MEPA's EIR requirement. 15 The Court 
was not persuaded by this argument and noted two factors that un-
dermined Massport's ability to use the 1969 activity as the com-
mencement of the runways project. First, the 1969 activity was not 
specifically directed to the construction of the runways project, but in-
stead was generally related to Massport's overall plan to prepare the 
Flats for several airport facilities.16 Second, in 1969, Massport's plans 
for runway expansion in the Flats included proposals for only one 
runway extension and did not encompass all three projects that consti-
tuted the controverted runways project. 17 Because of the tenuous link 
between the 1969 construction activity and the runways project as un-
dertaken in 1974, the Court rejected the earlier construction activity 
as the point of commencement of the runways project. 18 
The basic test used by the Court in determining the point of com-
mencement was the "existence of a commitment entered into prior to 
11 ld. at 304, 323 N.E.2d at 337, 7 E.R.C. at 1764, 5 E.L.R. at 20203. 
12 /d. at 315, 323 N.E.2d at 341,7 E.R.C. at 1767,5 E.L.R. at 20204. 
13 Id. at 322-23, 323 N.E.2d at 344, 7 E.R.C. at 1768, 5 E.L.R. at 20205. 
14 EOEA State Project Guideline Regs. § 13 (1973). MEPA provides that its im-
plementation is to be facilitated by a system of rules and regulations to be adopted by 
each of the various executive offices under the supervision of the Secretary of En-
vironmental Affairs. G.L. c. 30, § 62. This system is described in O'Brien and Miller, 
Environmental Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 18.4, at 442-49., 
15 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 297, 323 N.E.2d at 335, 7 E.R.C. at 1762, 5 E.L.R. at 
20201-02. 
18 Id. at 298-99, 323 N.E.2d at 336, 7 E.R.C. at 1762, 5 E.L.R. at 20202. Massport also 
planned to construct in the Flats facilities for fuel and cargo storage, airline hangers, 
and other improvements. 
17 I d. at 299, 323 N .E.2d at 336, 7 E.R.C. at 1762, 5 E.L.R. at 20202. 
18 Id. at 300, 323 N.E.2d at 336, 7 E.R.C. at 1763, 5 E.L.R. at 20202. 
8
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July 1, 1973, which [was] irreversible in nature, and which [had] a 
clearly defined objective."19 Although prior to this date Massport had 
executed a contract to surcharge a portion of the Flats to support 
runways, the Court noted that this contract was only intended to 
transform a portion of the Flats into dry land and did not commit 
Mass port to further construction of any sort. 20 The Court also found 
that two other events evidenced the absence of the requisite irreversi-
ble commitment: first, Massport had issued public statements in 
January, 1973, that final decis1ons regarding the runways project had 
not yet been made; and, second, that, as of the effective date of sec-
tion 62 of MEPA, Massport had not even contracted for preparation 
of preliminary plans for the runways project. 21 On the basis of these 
considerations, the Court concluded that the runways project had not 
commenced until "well after the effective date of§ 62."22 
It is not clear how useful Massport II will be in fashioning a general 
rule to establish a point of commencement for other projects alleged 
to have been undertaken in violation of MEP A. 23 In this regard, the 
most useful element of the Court's opinion on this point appears to be 
the Court's statement that the obligation to prepare a final EIR can-
not be at "such an early stage that the agency could not possibly ac-
cord full consideration to the ultimate impact of a given [project] 
proposal. "24 
Requirement of an environmental impact report. Contemporaneously 
with its execution, in May, 1974, of a contract to construct the run-
ways project, Massport submitted to the Executive Office of Transpor-
tation and Construction ("EOTC") and to the EOEA its determination, 
made by an assessment form,25 that the runways project would not cause 
"damage to the environment"26 and that consequently an EIR would not 
be prepared.27 The EOEA disagreed with Massport's determination and 
stated that, since the project could cause damage to the environment, 
MEPA required that an EIR be prepared. 28 The trial judge made an 
19 I d. at 298, 323 N.E.2d at 335, 7 E.R.C. at 1762, 5 E.L.R. at 20202. 
20 ld. at 300-01, 323 N.E.2d at 336, 7 E.R.C. at 1763, 5 E.L.R. at 20202. 
21 I d. at 301-03, 323 N.E.2d at 336-37, 7 E.R.C. at 1763, 5 E.L.R. at 20202. 
22 /d. at 304, 323 N.E.2d at 337, 7 E.R.C. at 1764, 5 E.L.R. at 20202-03. 
23 As this chapter was going to press, the Court rendered two decisions in which it 
held that projects had commenced prior to the effective date of§ 62. Marlow v. City of 
New Bedford, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 127, 141-42, 340 N.E.2d 494-99,-E.R.C.-, 
-E.L.R.-; Springfield Y Trust v. Executive Director, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 435, 441-42, 
341 N.E.2d 893,-E.R.C.-,-E.L.R.-. 
24 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 304, 323 N.E.2d at 337, 7 E.R.C. at 1764, 5 E.L.R. at 
20202. 
25 Assessment forms indicating that environmental damage will not result from a proj-
ect are termed "negative assessments." See O'Brien and Deland, Environmentai Law, I !173 
ANN. Suav. MASS. LAW§ 6.8, at 181-82 n.14. 
28 The term "damage to the environment" is defined in G.L. c. 30, § 61. 
27 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 306, 323 N.E.2d at 338, 7 E.R.C. at 1764, 5 E.L.R. at 
20203. 
28 I d. at 306, 323 N.E.2d at 338, 7 E.R.C. at 1764, 5 E.L.R. at 20203. 
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independent evaluation of the range of environmental impacts that might 
attend use of the runways project and also concluded that Massport's 
determination was incorrect.29 
On appeal, Massport challenged the propriety of the trial court's 
review, arguing that state agency MEPA determinations were subject 
only to the limited review provided by the Administrative Procedure 
Act.30 The Court dismissed Massport's argument31 and ruled that the 
trial court had correctly relied on the broader standard for judicial 
review of MEPA determinations posited in Boston v. Massachusetts Port 
Authority ("Massport /"). 32 In Massport I, the first enforcement action 
involving MEPA to reach the appellate level, the Court held that judi-
cial review of agency MEP A determinations should not be limited to 
inquiring whether an action was supported by substantial evidence or 
whether it was arbitrary and capricious. 33 The Court concluded that 
broad review was warranted because agency MEPA determinations 
are not appropriately characterized as either "adjudicatory" or "reg-
ulatory" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act,34 
and because considerations of "health" or "life" may be at stake in 
such determinations. 35 
In Massport I, however, the statutorily prescribed phased implemen-
tation of section 62 of MEPA was held to preclude full review of the 
challenged MEPA determination. 36 Since the section 62 EIR require-
ment was operative by the time Massport II was brought, the plaintiffs 
thus had access to the full administrative remedies comprehended by 
MEPA.37 In reviewing the trial court's findings, the Supreme Judicial 
Court, relying on the language of MEP A and on precepts developed 
pursuant to environmental impact review statutes in other jurisdic-
tions, articulated a "low threshold test" for evaluating the sufficiency 
of state agency MEPA determinations. 38 In Massport II, the trial court 
made this evaluation by reference to the EOEA's statement that an 
EIR should be prepared by Massport and by adducing additional evi-
dence regarding the impacts likely to result from the runways 
29 !d. 
30 G.L. c. 30A. 
31 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 311, 323 N.E.2d at 340, 7 E.R.C. at 1765, 5 E.L.R. at 
20203-04. 
32 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 308 N.E.2d 488, 6 E.R.C. 1337, 4 E.L.R. 20314. This 
case is reviewed in O'Brien and Miller, Environmental Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw 
§ 18.5, at 450-56. 
33 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 213, 308 N.E.2d at 505, 6 E.R.C. at 1348, 4 E.L.R. at 
20321. 
34 !d. at 210, 308 N.E.2d at 503, 6 E.R.C. at 1346, 4 E.L.R. at 20320. 
35 !d. at 212, 308 N.E.2d at 504, 6 E.R.C. at 1346, 4 E.L.R. at 20321. 
36 Id. at 213, 308 N.E.2d at 505, 6 E.R.C. at 1348, 4 E.L.R. at 20321. 
37 Massport II, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 313, 323 N.E.2d at 340, 7 E.R.C. at 1766, 5 
E.L.R. at 20204. 
38 Id. at 307-10, 323 N.E.2d at 338-39, 7 E.R.C. at 1764-65, 5 E.L.R. at 20203. 
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project.39 Massport assailed the trial court's reliance upon the EOEA 
statement, arguing that the court had incorrectly accorded the state-
ment the status of an "administrative determination."40 The Court re-
jected this characterization, but noted that, although MEPA did not 
vest the EOEA with the power to require an agency to prepare an 
EIR,41 such a statement was part of the system of administrative regu-
lations validly established under MEP A's directive. As such, the EOEA 
statement was necessarily "part of the administrative record to be re-
viewed along with other competent and relevant evidence in connec-
tion with an agency decision not to file an EIR."42 Further, the Court 
strongly suggested that trial court findings regarding state agency 
MEPA determinations would not be overturned readily on appellate 
review when supported by the EOEA's statement.43 
Although Massport admitted that certain significant environmental 
impacts would ensue if the various elements of the runways project 
were used to their full capacity, the state agency argued that it had 
no immediate obligation to prepare an EIR to document these im-
pacts because a Memorandum of Understanding executed between 
the EOTC and Massport had limited the uses of the runways project. 
Massport maintained that environmental impact review would be ap-
propriate as the restrictions in the Memorandum were modified and 
the elements of the runways project made subject to more intense and 
diverse use. 44 The Court rejected this argument, stating that such 
memoranda "should not be employed ... as a means of avoidance of 
completion of an EIR prior to commencing ... construction."45 The 
Court stressed MEPA's explicit requirement that an EIR be prepared 
prior to construction, but noted that memoranda of the sort involved 
in the runways project were relevant to the MEP A process, as factors 
that "should be part of an EIR and [that] could constitute important 
evidence that [a state agency] had met its obligation under § 61 to 
minimize damage to the environment."46 
The section 61 determination. Having thus resolved the first two issues 
presented by Massport's appeal, the Court resolved the question re-
garding Massport's compliance with section 61 of MEPA. The Court's 
resolution was simply stated: because Massport was obliged to prepare 
an EIR for this project, the determination of its compliance with sec-
tion 61 could be made only on the basis of a completed EIRY The 
39 !d. at 316-21, 323 N.E.2d at 342-43, 7 E.R.C. at 1767-68, 5 E.L.R. at 20204-05. 
40 !d. at 316, 323 N.E.2d at 342, 7 E.R.C. at 1767, 5 E.L.R. at 20204. 
41 !d. at 310 n.5, 323 N .E.2d at 339-40 n.5, 7 E.R.C. at 1765 n.5, 5 E.L.R. at 20203 
n.5. 
42 !d. at 317, 323 N.E.2d at 342, 7 E.R.C. at 1767, 5 E.L.R. at 20204. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 318, 323 N.E.2d at 342-43, 7 E.R.C. at 1767, 5 E.L.R. at 20205. 
45 !d. at 320, 323 N .E.2d at 343, 7 E.R.C. at 1768, 5 E.L.R. at 20205. 
46 !d. 
47 !d. at 322-23, 323 N .E.2d at 344, 7 E.R.C. at 1768, 5 E.L.R. at 20205. 
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section 61 issue niust be deferred, then, until the completion of an 
EIR for the runways project. 
§18.6. MEPA: Portents. In May, 1975, the MEPA study commis-
sion established by the Legislature in 1974 reported by recommending 
legislation to amend section 62 of chapter 30 of the General Laws. 1 
The recommended legislation was intended to clarify the rulemaking 
responsibilities of the agencies subject to MEPA, to provide authoriza-
tion for budgetary mechanisms to finance the environmental impact 
review process, and to clarify the textual error contained in the statute 
of limitations that the Legislature attempted to add by amendment 
in 1974.2 The Legislature did not enact the recommended legislation, 
but instead authorized the continuation of the commission3 and ex-
panded the scope of its mandate to include the advisability of having 
state agencies evaluate the economic and energy implications of their 
actions.4 
§18.7. Regulation of Pesticides in Massachusetts: Pending 
Developments. In 1972, Congress revised the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") to produce a regulatory 
system intended to embrace virtually every activity related to the pro-
duction and use of pesticides. 1 This 1972 enactment authorizes the 
EPA to develop a program for establishing comprehensive controls 
over the manufacture, shipment, distribution, sale, use, storage, and 
disposal of pesticides. FIFRA is intended to provjde a uniform 
nationwide system of pesticide regulation, but, like many federal en-
vironmental programs, the 1972 FIFRA comprehends a pattern of 
state-federal interaction relying upon the states' inherent interests and 
abilities in monitoring and controlling the use of pesticides within 
their domain. 
Of principal importance to those who would use, or be affected by 
the use of, a pesticide in Massachusetts is the elaborate use-
classification scheme established by the 1972 FIFRA. This use-
classification scheme is predicated upon a statutorily imposed stan-
dard that dictates the permissible uses for a given pesticide product 
and that is coupled with a program for the licensing of pesticide ap-
§18.6. 1 FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT LAWS, H. Doc. No. 6199 (1975). 
2 See O'Brien and Miller, Environmental Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAW § 18.5, at 
454-56. 
3 Resolves 1975, c. 10. 
4 Resolves 1975, c. 33. 
§18.7. 1 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA) of 1972, 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 136 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-140, 89 Stat. 751 (Nov. 28, 
1975). Prior to 1972, the federal pesticide law was contained in the FIFRA of 1947, ch. 
125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947). Although the 1947 FIFRA was initially administered by the 
United States Department of Agriculture, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. 
Reg. 15623, 84 Stat. 2086 (July 9, 1970), transferred these functions to the EPA. 
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plicators. Any pesticide product that, when used in the manner for 
which it is registered, will "generally cause . . . unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment," must be registered for "restricted use" 
and applied only "by or under the direct supervision of' a duly 
licensed pesticide applicator. 2 The EPA has taken the position that it 
will not itself undertake the applicator licensing program, but will 
evaluate each state program for Its adherence to the EPA-established 
applicator certification standards. 3 The consequence of this position is 
that, after October, 1977, the date upon which the 1972 FIFRA be-
comes fully effective, no restricted-use pesticide will be available for 
use in any state not having an EPA-approved plan for the licensing of 
pesticide applicators. 4 Such an event would be of grave consequence 
to those agricultural and other interests who rely greatly upon 
restricted-use pesticides. 
In light of the consequences that would ensue should the Com-
monwealth fail to develop a suitable program for the implementation 
of FIFRA's requirements, attention has been directed to the status of 
the Massachusetts pesticide control program. Massachusetts has pro-
vided for control over pesticides since 1946.5 Since that time, primary 
authority over pesticide distribution and usage has been vested in the 
Department of Public Health ("DPH"). In recent years, pesticide reg-
ulatory functions have been exercised by two separate units within the 
DPH: authority over the registration of pesticide products6 is con-
ferred upon the Division of Food and Drugs/ whereas the use of pes-
ticides has been regulated by the Pesticide Board.8 As a result of the 
reorganization of the EOEA, 9 however, the Pesticide Board and its 
use-regulation functions were transferred to the newly constituted 
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering ("DEQE"). 10 As 
this chapter is going to press, the Legislature is considering legislation, 
submitted on behalf of the DEQE, to revise existing pesticide statutes 
2 FEPCA (the I972 FIFRA) § 3(d)(l)(c), 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(d)(I)(c) (Supp. IV, I974). 
3 See 37 Fed. Reg. 6730-3I (1974). Section 4(a)(l) of FEPCA (the I972 FIFRA) re-
quires that the EPA establish standards for the certification of pesticide applicators, 7 
U.S.C. § 136b(a)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
4 FEPCA (the 1972 FIFRA) originally provided that this prohibition would become 
effective in October, I976. Pub. L. No. 92-5I6, § 4, 86 Stat. 973 (Oct. 21, 1972). As a 
result of an amendment to § 4 in I97 5, however, this deadline was postponed by one 
year, to October, I977. Pub. L. No. 94-I40, § 4, 89 Stat. 75I (Nov. 28, I975). 
5 Acts of 1946, c. 5I7, adding G.L. c. 270, § 2B, which imposed labeling requirements 
upon products containing DDT. This statute was repealed by Acts of I960, c. 727, § I. 
6 G.L. c. 94B, §§ II-21. 
7 /d. § I9. 
8 See id. §§ 2IA-22. 
9 Acts of 1974, c. 806, § 4I, effective July I, 1975. 
10 See G.L. c. 2IA, §§ 7, 8, as added by Acts of 1974, c. 806, §I; G.L. c. I7, § 9A, as 
amended by Acts of I975, c. 706, § 25. 
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to bring them into conformance with federal requirements. 11 
§18.8. Safe Drinking Water Act: Introduction. On December 16, 
1974, President Ford signed into law the Safe Drinking Water Act, 1 
which was intended to assure that water supply systems serving the 
public meet minimum national standards for the protection of public 
health.2 Although it was Congress' conclusion that the problem of 
unsafe drinking water is primarily the concern of state and local gov-
ernments, in passing the Safe Drinking Water Act, it mandated active 
federal participation through setting standards, providing research, 
and maintaining independent enforcement authority. 3 This structure 
reflects the reasoning behind the cooperative federal-state effort to 
combat air and water pollution problems that is embodied in the 
Clean Air Act4 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: 5 that the 
causes and effects of unhealthy drinking water are not confined 
within the borders of state or local jurisdictions. 6 
Specifically, the Safe Drinking Water Act (the "Act") requires that 
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") 
prescribe national primary drinking water regulations for contami-
nants that may adversely affect the public health. 7 These primary 
regulations are to include a maximum contaminant level, if monitor-
ing the level of the contaminant is feasible; if it is not feasible, the 
regulations must include treatment technique requirements.8 In addi-
tion, the EPA is to prescribe interim primary regulations, which would 
be revised after completion of a study by the National Academy of 
Sciences to determine what maximum contaminant levels might be al-
lowed in drinking water and, where no maximum levels can be ascer-
tained, what contaminants pose a threat to human health.9 The Act 
also provides that a state may assume primary enforcement responsi-
bility where the state has adopted regulations at least as stringent as 
the federal regulations, has formulated adequate surveillance and en-
forcement procedures, and-if the state allows variances and 
11 H. 4183 (1976). This legislation would repeal the existing bifurcated pesticide con-
trol program and replace it with a single program administered by the DEQE. 
§18.8. 1 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f et seq. (Supp. 1976). 
2 H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 6454, [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1185]. 
3 Id. at 6473. 
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857e (1970). 
5 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. (1970). 
6 H.R. REP. No. 1185, supra note 2, at 6459. 
7 Safe Drinking Water Act § 1412(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-1(b)(2) (Supp. 1976). See 
H.R. REP. No. 1185, supra note 2, at 6455. 
8 Safe Drinking Water Act§ 1412(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-1(b)(3) (Supp. 1976). 
9 ld. §§ 1412(b)(l)(B), 1412(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300g-1(b)(I)(B), 300g-1(b)(3) (Supp. 
1976). The study by the NAS is authorized in id. § 1412(e)(l), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 300g-l(e)(l) (Supp. 1976). 
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exemptions-has set forth conditions for them that are equally strin-
gent as the federal conditions for variances and exceptions. 10 The var-
ious sections of the Act will be discussed in detail below.U 
§18.9. Safe Drinking Water Act: Background. Prior to passage 
of the Act, the EPA, pursuant to section 361 of the Public Health Ser-
vice Act, 1 was authorized to prescribe federal drinking water stan-
dards only for water supplies used by interstate carriers. 2 The De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW")3 had inter-
preted its authority under section 361 to permit enforcement of stan-
dards only with respect to contaminants that may cause or carry a 
communicable disease.4 Thus, existing law was regarded as not allow-
ing for enforceable standards for contaminants that could cause chem-
ical poisoning or other noncommunicable diseases. In addition, there 
was no provision of federal law that protected the public not traveling 
on interstate carriers from being supplied with drinking water that 
could cause communicable diseases. 
In 1970, HEW conducted a survey of 969 public water systems. 
HEW found major deficiencies in the systems studied, a conclusion 
that is not surprising, given the lack of federal legislation regarding 
the quality of drinking water. 5 In addition, Congress found that the 
10 Id. § 1413(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-2(a) (Supp. 1976). 
11 §§ 18.9-.11 infra. 
§J8.9. I 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1970). 
2 I d. 
3 HEW was the federal agency administering section 361 of the Public Health Service 
Act prior to the EPA's assuming authority pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 
1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 ( 1970). . 
4 See H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. 
NEWS 6454. 
5 The major findings of the HEW study are set out in id. at 6457-58: 
Quality of water being delivered: 
Thirty-six percent of 2,600 individual tap water samples contained one or more 
bacteriological or chemical constitutents exceeding the limits in the Public Health 
Service Drinking Water Standards (established under Section 361 of the Public 
Health Service Act). 
Nine percent of these samples contained bacterial contamination at the 
consumer's tap evidencing potentially dangerous quality. 
Eleven percent of the samples drawn from 94 systems using surface waters as a 
source of supply exceeded the recommended organic chemical limit of 200 parts 
per billion. 
Status of physical facilities: 
Fifty-six percent of the systems evidenced physical deficiencies including poorly 
protected ground water sources, inadequate disinfection capacity, inadequate 
clarification capacity, and/or inadequate system pressure. 
In the eight metropolitan areas studied, the arrangements for providing water 
service were archaic and inefficient. While a majority of the population was served 
by one or a few large systems, each metropolitan area also contained small ineffi-
cient systems. 
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lack of quality in water systems was due to such factors as little public 
awareness of the dangers posed by drinking inadequately treated 
water, the costliness of effective treatment technology, and the intro-
duction of new compounds into the environment prior to ascertaining 
their harmful effect on the environment. 6 In passing the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, Congress sought to remedy these problems by direct-
ing that adequate standards for drinking water be developed and en-
forced. 
§18.10. Safe Drinking Water Act: Analysis of Principal Sections. 
Section 1401. Section 1401 of the Act defines "primary drinking 
water regulation" as a national regulation that is intended to protect 
public health to the maximum extent feasible from contaminants that 
may have any adverse health effect. 1 Thus, it was not intended that 
there be conclusive proof that any contaminant will cause adverse 
health effects as a condition precedent to regulation. All that is re-
quired is that the Administrator make a reasoned and plausible judg-
ment that a contaminant may have such an effect. 2 
Further, this section defines "public water system" as a system that 
has fifteen or more service connections or regularly serves twenty-five 
or more persons, regardless of whether the system is publicly or pri-
vately owned or operated.3 This broad definition would encompass 
nearly all public accommodations, including motels and campgrounds. 
Section 1412. Section 1412 requires that the EPA establish both in-
terim and revised primary drinking water regulations. 4 The interim 
Operators' qualifications: 
Seventy-seven percent of the plant operators· were inadequately trained in funda-
mental water microbiology; and 46 percent were deficient in chemistry relating to 
their plant operation. 
Status of community programs: 
The vast majority of systems were unprotected by programs to prevent drinking 
water supply pipes from being cross-connected with sewage or storm drainage 
pipes, programs for plumbing inspection on new construction, or programs for 
continuing surveillance of public water system operations. 
Status of State inspection and technical assistance programs: 
Seventy-nine percent of the systems were not inspected by State or county au-
thorities in 1968, the last full calendar year prior to the study. In 50 percent of the 
cases, plant officials did not remember when, if ever, a State or local health de-
partment had last surveyed the supply. 
An insufficient number of bacteriological samples were analyzed for 85 percent 
of the water systems-and 67 percent of the systems did not even analyze half of 
the numbers required by the PHS Drinking Water Standards. 
6 Id. at 6459. 
§18.10. 1 Safe Drinking Water Act§ 1401(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f(1) (Supp. 1976). 
2 H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. 
NEws 6454, 6463 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1185]. 
3 Safe Drinking Water Act§ 1401(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f(4) (Supp. 1976). 
4 /d. § 1412,42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-1(Supp. 1976). 
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standards, 5 based largely on review of the existing Public Health Ser-
vice drinking water standards, must protect the public health to the 
maximum extent feasible using treatment methods that are generally 
available as of December 16, 1974.6 
Because of the lack of data on health effects from certain known 
contaminants and the potential impact of, among other things, or-
ganic and inorganic compounds finding their way into public water 
supplies, the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") and the EPA will 
make arrangements for a study of maximum contaminant levels that 
should be permitted. 7 The formulation of maximum contaminant 
levels is intended to protect the public against known or anticipated 
health effects, allowing an adequate margin of safety. It is interesting 
to note that Congress, apparently wishing to insulate the NAS study 
from political and budgetary pressures, prohibited release of the 
study or any draft to the Office of Management and Budget or to any 
other federal agency, except the EPA, prior to its submission to 
Congress. 8 The report, which must be submitted no later than De-
cember 16, 1976,9 is thus to be based solely on considerations of pub-
lic health. 
Within ten days of release of the NAS report, the EPA must publish 
for comment its maximum contaminant level regulations and list of 
contaminants. At the same time, proposed revised national drinking 
water regulations must be published. 10 
Section 1413. Section 1413 prescribes the substantive conditions 
under which a state may be determined to have primary enforcement 
responsibility for the national standards.U For "primacy," the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA must find (1) that the state has adopted regu-
lations that the state can demonstrate are at least equally as stringent 
as national primary regulations; (2) adequate surveillance and en-
forcement procedures; 12 and (3) if the state permits variances and ex-
5 40 Fed. Reg. 11994-98 (1975). 
6 Safe Drinking Water Act§ 1412(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(a)(2) (Supp. 1976). 
7 Id. § 1412(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(e) (Supp. 1976). 
8 Id. § 1412(e)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(e)(5) (Supp. 1976). 
9 Id. § 1412(e)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(e)(2) (Supp. 1976). 
10 ld. § 1412(b)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(l)(A) (Supp. 1976). 
11 /d. § 1413(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-2(a) (Supp. 1976). A state can continue to enforce 
its own laws and regulations governing drinking water supplies until the national in-
terim primary regulation goes into effect in December, 1976. 
12 See 40 Fed. Reg. 33224-39 (1975). According to these proposed regulations, a state 
seeking EPA approval of its procedures for enforcement of equivalent state primary 
regulations must have a minimum capability in six distinct areas-inventory of public 
water systems, sanitary surveys, laboratory certification, availability of laboratory 
facilities to the state, design and construction, and statutory and regulatory enforcement 
authority-although such capabilities need not be completely implemented before pri-
macy may be granted. For example, the requirement of proposed § 142.IO(b)(2) for a 
systematic state program for sanitary sewers does not impose specific priorities for 
17
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emptions, measures that assure that such variances and exemptions 
are permitted under conditions no less stringent than those required 
by sections 1415 and 1416.13 
Section 1443. In order to implement the Congressional finding that 
safe drinking water requires a federal-state-local partnership, section 
1443 was added to provide funds for states to carry out public water 
system supervision programs. However, funding is tied to the re-
quirement that the EPA cannot make a grant to develop a state 
supervisory program unless it has assurances from the state that it 
will, within one year of the date of any grant, establish a public water 
system supervisory program and assume primary enforcement 
responsibility. 14 Many state officials have expressed reluctance to give 
such assurances where the costs of administering an effective program 
will exceed the funds available by way of federal grant15 and impose 
several demands on already deficient state budgets. One way for state 
and local governments to reduce the economic impact of the Act is to 
take advantage of the economies of scale inherent in regional water 
supply systems and management. 
Section 1414. Although the Act contemplates that states will assume 
the lead role in enforcing the drinking water regulations, it provides 
for federal enforcement where a state, having assumed enforcement 
authority pursuant to section 1413, fails to enforce the primary 
regulations. 16 Where the EPA finds a violation,17 notice must be 
given to the state. 18 If the alleged noncompliance extends beyond the 
either kinds of systems or the timing of such surveys, except to require some attention 
to systems clearly not in compliance with applicable standards. 40 Fed. Reg. at 33233. 
Similarly, with regard to laboratory facilities, a state administering agency need not 
have its own fully equipped laboratory. /d. (proposed § 142.10(b)(4)). This requirement 
may be satisfied by access to other public or private facilities, as long as there is the abil-
ity to have lab analyses performed when necessary. !d. at 33229. 
13 Safe Drinking Water Act§ 1413(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-2(a) (Supp. 1976). 
14 /d. § 1443(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-2(a)(2) (Supp. 1976). 
15 The fiscal year ("FY") 1976 authorization was $15,000,000, of which only 
$7,200,000 was actually appropriated. It is expected that the entire $25,000,000 au-
thorized for expenditure on state program grants in FY 1977 will be appropriated. The 
EPA projects that, by the end of the assumed six-year phase-in period, state program 
costs would reach $70,000,000 annually. See 40 Fed. Reg. 33231 (1975). 
16 Safe Drinking Water Act § 1414(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(a) (Supp. 1976). 
17 A violation occurs whenever a maximum contaminant level is exceeded or a treat-
ment technique is not followed, however briefly. H.R. REP. No. 1185, supra note 2, at 
6476. 
18 Safe Drinking Water Act § 1414(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(a) (Supp. 1976). In the 
event that the EPA finds evidence of a violation occurring in a state that does not have 
primary enforcement responsibility, notice need not be given to the state prior to com-
mencing suit to compel compliance. !d. 
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thirtieth day after notice, the EPA must notify the public of this find-
ing and, at the same time, request the state to report within fifteen 
days the specific measures to be taken to bring the system into 
compliance. 19 
If a system remains in noncompliance sixty days after the EPA's ini-
tial notice and the state failed to submit the required report or if the 
EPA, after considering the report, determines that the state abused its 
discretion20 in carrying out primary enforcement by failing to imple-
ment adequate compliance procedures within sixty days, the EPA may 
bring a civil action in the appropriate United States district court.21 A 
willful violation of the primary drinking water regulation or com-
pliance schedule may result in the imposition of a civil penalty not to 
exceed $5,000 for each day of violation. 22 
Finally, and most significantly, section 1414 (c) requires each owner 
or operator of a public water system to give notice,23 in a form pre-
scribed by the EPA, to the users of the system and the public under 
certain circumstances of noncompliance with the Act. 24 The purpose 
of the notice requirement is to make the public aware of real and po-
tential health hazards and foment public awareness of the problems of 
public water systems to stimulate necessary local spending to cure 
such problems. 25 
19 /d. § 1414(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1976). In its discussion of 
this section, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce proclaimed 
that the report should include a statement of the legal authority that a state would rely 
on for effecting compliance. It stated unequivocally that mere declarations of intent to 
commence legal proceedings or initiate other actions would be deemed insufficient for 
purposes of this section. H.R. REP. No. 1185, supra note 2, at 6475. 
20 Regarding its interpretation of "abuse of discretion," the Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce stated that any failure to implement adequate procedures by 
the sixtieth day to effect compliance by the earliest feasiole time is to be considered a per se 
abuse of discretion by the state. Such a failure would constitute an abuse whether it results 
from negligence, inattention, or lack of adequate technical and enforcement personnel. 
See H.R. REP. No. 1185, supra note 2, at 6475. 
21 Safe Drinking Water Act § 1414(a)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 
1976). 
22 /d. § 1414(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(b) (Supp. 1976). 
23 /d. § 1414(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(c) (Supp. 1976). Such notice must be given not 
less than once every three months. Any person who willfully violates this provision shall 
be fined not more than $5,000. !d. 
24 /d. (1) When a system fails to comply with a maximum contaminant level; (2) when 
a system fails to use any of the required treatment techniques; (3) when a system fails to 
perform testing or monitoring as required by regulation or by § 1445; (4) when a sys-
tem has received a variance under§ 1415(a)(1)(A) or 1415(a)(2), or an''!xemption under 
§ 1416; or (5) when a system has failed to comply with any schedule or control measure 
prescribed pursuant to a variance or exemption. !d. 
25 H.R. REP. No. 1185, supra note 2, at 6476. 
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Sections 1415 and 1416. Congress included provisions for variances 
and exemptions in recognition of the particular difficulty that certain 
systems would have in meeting the standards prescribed in the 
regulations. 26 These provisions are designed to provide additional 
time for compliance where the public health would not be en-
dangered. 
Section 1415 permits variances from drinking water regulations 
after notice, opportunity for a public hearing, and review by the EPA 
to assure that a state has not abused its discretion in granting 
variances. 27 Variances may be granted in two instances by a state with 
primary enforcement responsibility: (1) where a system cannot meet 
maximum contaminant level requirements despite application of the 
most effective treatment methods, 28 and (2) where a satisfactory show-
ing can be made that the prescribed treatment is unnecessary to pro-
tect the public health. 29 In states that have not assumed primary en-
forcement responsibility, the EPA may grant variances in the same 
manner that a state, having enforcement responsibility, could grant 
such variances. 30 It should be noted that schedules of variances, 
whether granted by the EPA or a state, are enforceable by the EPA 
under section 1414 as if such schedules were part of a national pri-
mary drinking water regulation. 31 
Upon a finctmg that a public water system is unable to comply with 
any maximum contaminant level or treatment technique requirement 
due to compelling factors, 32 a state with primary enforcement respon-
sibility may grant an exemption to such system pursuant to section 
1416.33 A state-granted exemption carries with it a requirement that 
within one year of issuance, the state, after notice and opportunity for 
26 See Safe Water Drinking Act §§ 1415(a)(1)(A), 1416(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300g-4 
(a)(1)(A), 300g-5(a) (Supp. 1976). 
27 Id. § 1415, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-4 (Supp. 1976). Although some EPA review of 
state-granted variances was warranted, it was not intended that the EPA undertake a 
case-by-case review. EPA notice to a state under this section is therefore only warranted 
when in a significant number of cases it can be shown that a state's action in granting 
such variances was inconsistent with the requirements of the Act. See H.R. REP. No. 
1185, supra note 2, at 6478-79. 
28 Safe Drinking Water Act § 1415(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-4(a)(l)(A) (Supp. 
1976). Before a state may grant such a variance, it must ascertain that the variance will 
not result in an unreasonable risk to health. 
29 Id. § 1415(a)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-4(a)(l)(B) (Supp. 1976). This variance would 
apply where a system's raw water source is substantially cleaner than the minimum in-
take requirements. 
30 !d. § 1415(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-4(a)(2) (Supp. 1976). 
31 !d. § 1414(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(b) (Supp. 1976). 
32 "Compelling factors" include economic factors, such as the high costs of purchasing 
and constructing necessary equipment or facilities and the low per capita income and 
small number of residents in a community served by the system. H.R. REP. No. 1185, 
supra note 2, at 6480. 
33 Safe Drinking Water Act§ 1416(a)(l), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-5(a)(1) (Supp. 1976). 
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a public hearing, must prescribe a schedule, including increments of 
progress and interim control measures, for the life of the exemp-
tion.34 The compliance schedule must require compliance as 
expeditiously as practicable, but no later than January 1, 1981, in the 
case of an exemption from an interim regulation, and no later than 
seven years after the effective date of a revised regulation.35 As in the 
case of variances, exemptions are subject to review by the EPA 36 and 
the EPA may issue exemptions for states that do not have primary en-
forcement responsibility.37 
Section 14 31. Section 1431 confers emergency powers upon the 
Administrator, which are exercisable upon receipt of information re-
garding a contaminant that poses "an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to the health of persons."38 These emergency powers, 
which override any limitations of other sections of the Act, are to be 
invoked only if state and local authorities have failed to initiate 
emergency abatement efforts.39 Orders may be issued under this au-
thority notwithstanding existing regulations, variances, exemptions, or 
other requirements. 40 
Other Provisions. Part C of the Act provides for the protection of 
underground sources from which drinking water is drawn, by means 
of a regulatory program similar to that governing public water 
systems. 41 The Act prohibits control program regulations from inter-
fering with oil or natural gas production, or disposal of production 
by-products, unless such regulations are essential to prevent danger to 
underground drinking water sources. 42 
Section 1441 provides a mechanism to alleviate the difficulty that 
many public systems have experienced in recent months in obtaining 
adequate supplies of chlorine for treatment of contaminants.43 It au-
34 Id. § 1416(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-5(b) (Supp. 1976). 
35 Id. § 1416(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-5(b)(2) (Supp. 1976). In either case, two addi-
tional years may be granted if the system is entering into a regional water system. 
36 Id. § 1416(d), 42 U.S.CA. § 300g-5(d) (Supp. 1976). 
37 Id. § 1416(£), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-5(f) (Supp. 1976). 
38 Id. § 1431(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300i(a) (Supp. 1976). 
39 /d. 
40 Id. Any person who willfully violates or fails or refuses to comply with an order is-
sued under this section may be fined up to $5,000 per day of violation. ld. § 1431(b), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 300i(b) (Supp. 1976). 
41 Id. §§ 1421-24, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300h-300h-3 (Supp. 1976). 
42 Id. § 1422(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-1(c) (Supp. 1976). 
43 According to the EPA, in the past year, fifty-seven water and wastewater utilities 
had reported shortages of chlorine (down to one to ten days' supply on hand) and 
thirty-three wastewater and four public water supply treatment systems were reported 
to have ceased chlorinating for periods up to two weeks. It appears that only a portion 
of the shortages have been reported to the EPA. Among the cities experiencing such 
shortages have been Denver, Jersey City, Newark, Chicago, and New York, and many 
smaller public water supply systems. Increased demand from private industry, delay in 
the construction of new chlorine production facilities, and downtime in existing facilities 
have contributed to this problem. See H.R. REP. No. 1185, supra note 2, at 6460. 
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thorizes the EPA to issue, in advance of actual need, certificates of 
need for chlorine and other substances used for treatment of water in 
both public water systems and wastewater treatment works. Upon is-
suance of a certificate of need, the President or his delegate must 
issue a mandatory allocation order to assure the availability of the 
needed substance by the time required.44 Although the President has 
discretion as to which processor, manufacturer, or producer must 
supply the requirements of a certificate of need, he has no discretion 
in deciding whether to issue an allocation order. 
Section 1445 establishes broad authority for the EPA to promulgate 
rules for record keeping, reporting, and monitoring to assure the 
public availability of information on drinking water. The section also 
permits the right of entry to premises of systems and persons subject 
to provisions of the Act for inspection and sampling.45 
Finally, section 1449 provides for commencement of civil suits by 
citizens to enforce the provisions of the Act. The right to bring suit is 
limited only by the requirement that sixty-days' prior notice be given 
to the EPA, to the state in which the violation occurs, and to the 
source alleged to be in violation.48 This provision is comparable to the 
citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act47 and the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,48 except that section 
1449 provides that a judge may require the filing of a bond or equiv-
alent security if a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction 
is sought. 49 
§18.11. Safe Drinking Water Act: Federal Implementation. 
Pursuant to sections 1412, 1414, 1415, and 1450 of the Act, the EPA 
proposed its interim primary drinking water standards on March 14, 
1975.1 These standards were based largely on the 1962 Public Health 
Service Drinking Water Standards and a review of those standards by 
the EPA Advisory Committee Report on the Revision and Application 
of the Drinking Water Standards.2 Since past monitoring evidence 
made it clear that it was feasible to ascertain maximum contaminant 
levels, the Administrator of the EPA determined that it was economi-
cally and technologically feasible to monitor drinking water for con-
taminants at the maximum levels. Thus, the interim regulations do 
not contain required treatment techniques. 3 
The proposed regulations also include strict requirements for in-
44 Safe Drinking Water Act§ 1441(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j(c)(1) (Supp. 1976). 
4
" ld. § 1445, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-4 (Supp. 1976). 
48 Id. § 1449, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8 (Supp. 1976). 
47 42 u.s.c. § 1857h-2 (1970). 
48 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. III 1973). 
49 Safe Drinking Water Act§ 1449(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8(d) (Supp. 1976). 
§18.11. 1 40 Fed. Reg. 11994-98 (1975). These standards are intended to compose 
40 C.F.R. Part 141. 
2 40 Fed. Reg. at ll99l. 
3 Id. at ll990-9l. 
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forming water system users and the general public on a tri-monthly 
basis whenever any part of a water system fails to comply with the re-
quirements of Part 141, which includes the various maximum stan-
dards and monitoring requirements. The notice must be by publica-
tion in local newspapers, by giving copies to television and radio sta-
tions serving the area within thirty-six hours of confirmation of non-
compliance, and by inclusion of the notice in all water bills. As a part 
of the notice, suppliers are permitted to include a fair explanation 
of the public health significance of any violation, variance, or 
exemption.4 The notice provisions also apply where a system has re-
ceived a variance or an exemption under the Act or has failed to 
comply with any schedule or control measure prescribed pursuant to 
a variance or exemption.5 
The EPA's objective, having proposed its interim contaminant stan-
dards, was to develop regulations governing federal grants for state 
public water system supervisory programs and establishing procedures 
to implement the standards, including assumption of primary en-
forcement responsibility by the states in accordance with section 1413 
of the Act. 6 
To assist the states in establishing programs in order to assume 
primary enforcement responsibility, section 1443(a) of the Act au-
thorizes the EPA to make grants not to exceed 7 5 percent of the eli-
gible costs of a state program. 7 Nonetheless, section 1443(a)(2) pro-
vides that no state may receive its first grant until the EPA determines 
that the state has established or will establish within one year of the 
grant, a public water system supervisory program, and within that 
same period, assume primary enforcement responsibility for all public 
water systems within its jurisdiction.8 Thus, section 35.630(e) of the 
grant regulations requires a state's initial application to include a letter 
from its chief executive officer stating whether it has or intends to as-
sume the enforcement and supervisory program responsibilities.9 If a 
state makes these commitments but fails to assume and maintain en-
forcement responsibility, it cannot receive any grant after the initial 
year's funding. 10 In addition, an EPA Regional Administrator may 
reduce a state's grant if the submitted program does not contain 
planned accomplishments11 or if the actual accomplishments fall be-
low the level approved in the state's program plan. 12 
4 !d. at 11998 (proposed § 141.32(a)). 
5 !d. (proposed§ 141.32(b)). 
6 /d. at 33224-39. 
7 Safe Drinking Water Act § 1443(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-2(a) (Supp. 1976). 
8 /d. § 1443(a)(2), 42 U .S.C.A. § 300j-2(a)(2) (Supp. 1976). 
9 40 Fed. Reg. 33227 (1975). These regulations are intended to compose 40 C.F.R. 
Part 35. 
10 40 Fed. Reg. at 33227 (proposed § 35.634(b)). 
11 /d. at 33226-27 (proposed§§ 35.615(a), 35.618). 
12 !d. at 33227 (proposed § 35.640). 
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In subpart A of proposed Part 142,13 which implements the na-
tional primary drinking water standards contained in Part 141, the 
EPA has modified two definitions originally proposed in the March 
14, 1975, proposed Interim Primary Standards.14 First, "maximum 
contaminant level"15 was altered to exclude contamination that is the 
fault of the user. 16 As a result of language in the legislative history of 
the Act that implied that contaminants were to be measured at the 
consumer's tap, 17 the interim standards extended the Act's definition 
of "maximum contaminant level"18 to refer to contaminant levels "in 
water which is delivered to the free flowing outlet of the ultimate user 
of a public water system."19 Such a definition ignores the lack of con-
trol that a public water system has over contamination of water after it 
has been delivered to the consumer, unless the contamination is 
caused by deterioration of the user's pipes from corrosive qualities of 
the water.20 
Second, the definition of "public water system" was also modified. 
The proposed interim standards concluded that the phrase "regularly 
serves an average of at least twenty-five individuals" meant at least 
three months per year.21 Because it was determined that this defini-
tion was not adequate to control seasonal public water systems operat-
ing only two months a year, which include many campgrounds and 
other tourist facilities, the definition of "public water system" was al-
tered accordingly. 22 
State enforcement. It was the EPA's conclusion that in order to effec-
tuate Congress's intent that the states have the principal responsibility 
for regulating public water systems, a flexible approach to state en-
forcement was necessary. Therefore, in the draft of its National Safe 
Drinking Water Strategy released in May, 1975, the EPA described five 
levels of state participation that could occur under section 1413 of the 
13 Id. at 33232. These regulations are intended to compose 40 C.F.R. Part 142. 
14 These standards are set out at 40 Fed. Reg. 11994-98 (1975). 
15 Id. at 11994 (proposed§ 141.2(d)). 
16 /d. at 33232 (proposed § 142.2(b)). 
17 See H.R. REP. No. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 6454, 6466. 
18 Safe Drinking Water Act§ 1401(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f(3) (Supp. 1976). 
19 40 Fed. Reg. at 11994 (proposed§ 141.2(d)). 
20 This issue recently arose as a result of an EPA funded study of Boston, Somerville, 
and Cambridge drinking water by Dr. Worth of the Tufts-New England Medical 
Center. The study showed levels of lead in excess of the proposed interim standard of 
.050 micrograms per liter. As a result, the Metropolitan District Commission asked the 
Legislature for additional funds for anticorrosion control that would alleviate the con-
tamination taking place in old lead service lines that run into homes in the studied area 
from the iron water mains of the public system. Boston Globe, June 5, 1975, § 1, at 1, 
col. 3. 
21 40 Fed. Reg. at 11994 (proposed§ 141.2(£)). 
22 I d. at 33232 (proposed § 142.2(c) ). 
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Act, four of which would entitle the state to some federal assistance 
under section 1443: 
I. Fully operational State programs, certified for primary enforce-
ment responsibility, without limitations or extensive Federal assis-
tance beyond the State Program Grants. 
II. State programs certified for primary enforcement responsibility 
with EPA providing limited and informal technical assistance (along 
with State Program Grants). 
III. State programs certified for primary enforcement responsibil-
ity contingent on certain limited formal agreements for EPA to pro-
vide specific assistance to the State for a limited time period (along 
with State Program Grants). The formal assistance provided to the 
State could be used as part of the justification to obtain certifica-
tion of its primary enforcement program. 
IV. EPA retaining primary responsibility for the program, with 
provisions for working agreements whereby the State would carry 
out certain aspects of the program. (State program grant would 
be available only for FY 76). 
V. EPA retaining full responsibility for the program with the State 
assuming no part of the program. 
The subpart B regulations, while setting forth the requirements that 
a state must meet in order to qualify for primary enforcement re-
sponsibility, and the manner in which it may apply for a determina-
tion by EPA on this issue, reflect the notion of flexibility by permit-
ting local differences in implementing the five basic requirements of 
section 1413(a) listed above. As an example, the preamble states that 
although a state cannot be determined to have primary enforcement 
responsibility until it has adopted and will have an effective standard 
when comparable federal standards become effective, there is no re-
quirement that the state standard be identical to the national stan-
dard. Thus, a state may specify a sample analysis method not con-
tained in the national standard, provided this alternate analysis is as 
accurate and reliable as the method prescribed in the national 
standard.23 
Of some concern, however, is the EPA's enforcement requirement, 
proposed section 142.10(b) of title 40 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, which divides the criteria for state enforcement into six distinct 
elements. 24 According to the preamble to the proposed regulations, a 
state is required to have a minimum capability in these six areas as a 
prerequisite to assuming primary enforcement responsibility.25 This 
23 !d. at 33229. 
24 !d. at 33233 (proposed § l42.10(b)). These elements are inventory of public water 
systems, sanitary surveys, laboratory certification, availability of laboratory facilities to 
the state, design and construction, and statutory and regulatory enforcement authority. 
25 See the discussion of proposed § 142.10(a) in 40 Fed. Reg. at 33229. 
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would appear to be somewhat more restrictive than either Congress, 
or the EPA elsewhere in its regulations, intended, and may in fact 
delay timely assumption of primary enforcement responsibility. Con-
sider, for example, a state that does not have a laboratory certification 
program because of a lack of statutory authority, but meets all other 
requirements of the subpart B regulations. Section 142.10(b), as pro-
posed, appears to preclude a favorable finding for purposes of pri-
mary enforcement until that statutory authority is obtained, even 
though the state may be otherwise capable and ready to assume such 
responsibility. This problem could be eliminated by permitting limited 
EPA assistance on a temporary basis. In the above example, the state 
could request the EPA to operate the certification program on an in-
terim basis, pending adequate statutory enactment. Program grants 
under section 1443 of the Act could be tailored to take into account 
this temporary deficiency. It would appear that this approach is con-
sistent with Congress' intention that safe drinking water be the result 
of a federal-state partnership. 
In assessing the evaluation criteria of section 142.10(b), it should be 
noted that the EPA has given no guidance as to what constitutes 
"statutory and regulatory enforcement authority adequate to compel 
compliance with the State primary drinking water standards."26 Pre-
sumably, adequate enforcement authority would include the follow-
ing: ( 1) authority to enjoin and assess or sue to recover appropriate 
civil or criminal fines for violations or threatened violations of the 
regulations (no specific penalty is required, but the federal maximum 
penalty of $5,000 per day for willful violations has been urged as an 
appropriate amount); (2) procedures enabling the state to halt or 
eliminate any imminent or substantial endangerment of the public 
health; (3) authority to enforce the regulations against all public water 
systems covered by the Act within its jurisdiction; (4) procedures for 
right of entry, sampling, and inspection of public water supply sys-
tems; (5) procedures requiring owners, operators of water supply sys-
tems, or both, to monitor, accumulate, and submit records; (6) proce-
dures requiring that the public be notified whenever any public water 
supply system fails to meet the requirements of law or regulations 
promulgated thereunder; (7) citizen suit provisions; and (8) variance 
and exemption provisions no less stringent than those contained in 
sections 1415 and 1416 of the Act. It must be assumed, however, that 
a judgment as to the adequacy of a state's enforcement authority will 
be made on a state-by-state basis, taking into account not only avail-
able statutory authority but also the ability and willingness to imple-
ment it. 
26 !d. at 33233 (proposed § 142.10(b)(6)). 
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§18.12. Air Pollution: Introduction. Several judicial decisions 
were rendered during the Survey year that have had a significant im-
pact on enforcement of the air pollution regulatory requirements of 
the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. First, the United 
States Supreme Court, in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 1 definitively established a state's authority to grant variances from 
air pollution control requirements, provided such variances do not in-
terfere with attainment and maintenance of the national ambient air 
quality standards. Second, in late summer, the Superior Court for 
Suffolk County, in Bicknell v. City of Boston, 2 exercised its i~unctive 
powers to enforce the state's air pollution emission limitations against 
the City's municipal refuse incinerator and ordered the facility to 
cease operations. Finally, as a result of the decision by the First Circuit 
in South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 3 both EPA and the Commonwealth 
undertook a substantial effort to develop enforceable transportation 
controls for the Metropolitan Boston area that would achieve the 
necessary air emission reductions without economic and social chaos. 
These plans were published on June 12, 1975,4 and by the end of the 
Survey year, seemed certain to be implemented unless challenged 
further by the South Terminal petitioners. 
§18.13. Air Pollution: Train v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council. 1 In its first extensive examination of the Clean Air Act (the 
"Act"),2 the United States Supreme Court held that the Act permits 
states to grant variances from state implementation plan ("SIP") re-
quirements, provided that these variances do not interfere with at-
tainment or maintenance of the national ambient air quality 
standards.3 The Court entertained the case on the EPA's petition for 
certiorari because of the disagreement among the circuit courts of ap-
peal whether a state could revise its implementation plan, subject to 
EPA approval in accordance with section 110(a)(3) of the Act, 4 to 
delay compliance with emission limitations for individual sources, or 
whether all deferrals of plan requirements had to be treated under 
the more stringent procedural and substantive standards of section 
llO(f) of the Act. 5 It was the EPA's position that a state could revise 
§18.12. I 421 u.s. 60, 7 E.R.C. 1733, 3 E.L.R. 20264 (1975). 
2 8 E.R.C. 1241, 3 E.L.R. 20712 (Super. Ct. 1973). 
3 304 F.2d 646, 6 E.R.C. 2023, 4 E.L.R. 20768 (1st Cir. 1974). 
4 40 Fed. Reg. 8661-81 (1973). 
§18.13. I 421 u.s. 60, 7 E.R.C. 1733, 3 E.L.R. 20264 (1973). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1837-1837e (1970). 
3 421 U.S. at 98-99, 7 E.R.C. at 1748, 3 E.L.R. at 20273. For a background discussion 
of the Clean Air Act and its implementation see § 18.14, at notes 4-7 infra. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a)(3) (1970). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 1837c-3(f) (1970). 
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its plan if the individual variance would not affect attainment or 
maintenance of the national standards. 6 
In reviewing the variance provisions of the Georgia SIP, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 7 had rejected the EPA's construction of the 
Act and held that section 110(£) provided the exclusive mechanism for 
granting variances from SIP requirements. 8 In part, the Fifth Circuit 
relied on the technology-forcing nature of the Act, reasoning that be-
cause the statute was intended to force technology to meet specific 
standards, it was essential that commitments made during initial plan-
ning stages could not be readily abandoned when the time for com-
pliance arrived. 9 
Although none of the other circuits adopted the Fifth Circuit's posi-
tion, neither did they agree with the EPA position. The First Circuit, 
in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 10 a case challenging, 
inter alia, the variance provisions of the Massachusetts SIP, concluded 
that a state could grant variances during the period before the three-
year date for mandatory attainment of primary standards, but that 
after attainment, section 110(£) was the exclusive procedure by which 
variances could be granted.U This view was subsequently adopted by 
the Eighth Circuit12 and the Second Circuitl 3 in similar actions 
brought by the Natural Resources Defense Council. The Ninth 
Circuit, 14 however, chose a third interpretation, which was closer to 
the EPA's position before the Supreme Court, holding that since the 
legislative history of the Act did not support any "pre-attainment" and 
"post-attainment" distinction, a state could gran.t variances at any time, 
provided that any such variance would not interfere with attainment 
or maintenance of the national ambient standards. 15 
In the Supreme Court's opinion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated that 
although it is the EPA's responsibility under the Act to set national 
ambient standards, the Act does not give the agency authority to ques-
tion a SIP that provides for the attainment of these standards. 16 Thus, 
it is left to each state to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it 
6 421 U.S. at 70, 7 E.R.C. at 1738, 5 E.L.R. at 20266. 
7 489 F.2d 390, 6 E.R.C. 1248, 4 E.L.R. 20204 (5th Cir. 1974). 
8 Id. at 401, 6 E.R.C. at 1254-55, 4 E.L.R. at 20208. 
9 !d., 6 E.R.C. at 1255, 4 E.L.R. at 20208. 
10 478 F.2d 875, 5 E.R.C. 1879, 3 E.L.R. 20375 (1st Cir. 1973). 
11 Id. at 886, 5 E.R.C. at 1885, 3 E.L.R. at 20378. 
12 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 693-94, 5 E.R.C. 
1917, 1919, 3 E.L.R. 20821, 20822-23 (8th Cir. 1973). 
13 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 523,6 E.R.C. 1475, 
1477, 4 E.L.R. 20345, 20346 (2d Cir. 1974). 
14 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 7 E.R.C. 1181, 5 
E.L.R. 20032 (9th Cir. 1974). 
15 Id. at 914, 7 E.R.C. at 1186, 5 E.L.R. at 20035. 
16 421 U.S. at 79, 7 E.R.C. at 1741. 5 E.L.R. at 20268-69. 
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deems appropriate to satisfy the national requirements. The Court 
viewed the variance procedure as being consistent with the authority 
under section 110(a)(3) of the Act, which it regarded as "the 
mechanism by which the States may obtain approval of their develop· 
ing policy choices as to the most practicable and desirable methods of 
restricting total emissions to a level which is consistent with the na-
tional ambient air standards."17 
The Supreme Court's decision presumably permits the EPA to allow 
state-granted variances at any time so long as they do not interfere 
with attainment and maintenance of the standards. This will prove to 
be a significant decision for the Commonwealth since Massachusetts' 
SIP and its variance authority has been bound by the First Circmt's 
holding in the first case brought by the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, that variances may be permitted without resorting to section 
110(£) procedures only during the preattainment period. 18 
§18.14. Air Pollution: BickneU v. City of Boston. 1 On August 1, 
1975, the Superior Court for Suffolk County entered two decisions 
and orders for judgment restraining and enjoining the City of Boston 
from further operation of its South Bay Avenue municipal incinerator 
until the City complied with an order of the Commissioner of Public 
Health2 and certain air pollution control regulations of the Metropoli-
tan Boston Air Pollution Control District. 3 The case is a landmark vic-
tory, evidencing a judicial willingness to enforce environmental stan-
dards against municipal governments by requiring expeditious correc-
tion or prompt shutdown of the offending facilities. 
Background. As a prelude to a discussion of the Bicknell case, it is 
appropriate to set forth some background information on the control 
of air pollution in the Commonwealth. 4 In enacting the federal Clean 
Air Act, 5 Congress declared its intention to develop a national strategy 
to control air pollution, while leaving each state to develop its own 
plan to achieve the national objectives within its jurisdiction. Thus, ac-
cording to federal guidelines,6 each state developed its plans to 
17 /d. at 80, 7 E.R.C. at 1741, 5 E.L.R. at 20269. 
18 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 886, 5 E.R.C. 1879, 
1885, 3 E.L.R. 20375, 20378 (1st Cir. 1973). 
§18.14. 1 8 E.R.C. 1241, 5 E.L.R. 20712 (Super. Ct. 1975). 
2 !d. at 1245, 5 E.L.R. at 20715. 
3 /d. at 1249,5 E.L.R. at 20717. 
4 For an extensive discussion of the basic statutory and regulatory requirements for 
controlling air_pollution under the federal Clean Air Act by the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Public Health and the federal Environmental Protection Agency, see Miller, 
Environmental Law, 1972 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§§ 21.2-.6, at 578-602. 
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857e (1970). 
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a)(2)(B)-(H) (1970); 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.22 (1975). 
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achieve the national established ambient air quality standards within 
its designated air quality control regions. 7 The Massachusetts State 
Implementation Plan ("SIP") was adopted bv the. Department of Pub-
lic Health ("DPH") in January, 1972, and submitted to the EPA for 
approval. Once it was approved by the EPA, its substantive provisions 
became enforceable both by the EPA under section 1857c-8 of titl~ 42 
of the United States Code and by the Commonwealth under sections 
142B and 142D of chapter Ill of the General Laws. 
A portion of the SIP Included the Regulations for Control of Air 
Pollution in the Metropolitan Boston Air Pollution Control District 
(the "District"). 8 In order to achieve the national primary ambient 
particulate matter standard in the District, the regulations contain 
several sections specifically aimed at reducing particulate emissions 
from new and existing stationary soun;es. Regulation 2 limits emis-
sions of particulates from various categories of industrial sources, in-
cluding fossil fuel utilization facilities, foundries, asphalt hatching 
plants, and incinerators, while regulation 6 prohibits the emission of 
smoke from a source of density, shade, or appearance greater than 
number 1 of the Ringelmann Chart. 9 Regulation 8 expresses certain 
limitations on incineration of refuse, and regulation 1 is a general 
nuisance provision enforceable against sources causing or contributing 
to a condition of air pollution.10 These regulations are enforceable 
under the authority of section 142B of chapter Ill of the General 
Laws, which makes knowing violation of any District rule or regula-
tion punishable by fines of $10 to $50 per day. Section 142B also 
permits the DPH to issue administrative orders to any person control-
ling a source to abate its air pollution problem. 11 Violation of an 
order carries a fine of $50 to $100 per day for first offenses, and 
$200 to $500 for subsequent violations. The superior court, sitting in 
equity, has the power to restrain violations of such orders under au-
thority of section 142B. 
Bicknell. The superior court action against the City of Boston's in-
cinerator operation represents the final chapter in a lengthy struggle 
7 40 C.F.R. §§ 81.12-.267 (1975). 
8 Originally filed with the Secretary of State on April 24, 1972, and made effective as 
of June 1, 1972. . . . 
• The Ringelmann Chart or Scale was develope~ for ~radmg the density of smoke; It 
is published in the U.S. Bureau of Mines Information Ctrcular No. 8333. 
10 The regulations define air pollution as . . . 
the presence in the ambient air space of one or more air contammants or combma-
tions thereof in such concentrations and of such duration as to: 
a. cause a nuisance; 
b. be iiUurious, or be on the basis of current information, potentially injurious 
to human or animal life, to vegetation, or to property; or 
c. unreasonably interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property 
or the conduct of business. 
11 Any such order is subject to the state's Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. c. 30A. 
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by the DPH to control a significant source of air pollution in the Met-
ropolitan Boston area. In October, 1972, the City submitted a 
schedule to the DPH that reflected installation of a new incinerator as 
its selected means of complying with various District regulations, par-
ticularly regulation 2.5.3, which li'mits particulate emissions from exist-
ing incinerators operating in the District to .1 0 grains per Standard 
Cubic Foot at 12 percent C02. 12 After conferring with the City, the 
DPH issued an order on March 7, 1973, requiring successful comple-
tion of the compliance effort by July 31, 1975. As a result of an ad-
ministrative hearing held pursuant to chapter 30A of the General 
Laws, a revised compliance schedule, maintaining the July 31, 1975 
compliance date, was made final on December 20, 1973. 13 When the 
City failed to satisfy the initial increments of its ordered schedule, the 
matter was referred to the Attorney General for enforcement in the 
superior court. During the pendency of the matter before the state 
court, the EPA initiated enforcement action against the City under 
section 185 7 c-8(a)(l) of title 42 of the United States Code for its failure 
to comply with the requirements of regulation 2.5 and regulation 6, 
which became federally enforceable when the EPA approved the Mas-
sachusetts SIP. 14 Subsequently, a federal order was issued and its en-
forcement in federal district court was being considered at the time 
the action was heard before the superior court. 
The Commissioner's suit was brought to enforce the DPH's De-
cember 20, 1973 order or, in the alternative, to restrain the City from 
violating sections 142A through 142H of chapter 111 of the General 
Laws and the regulations promulgated thereunder, particularly regu-
lation 6.2.1 and regulations 8.1.3 and 8.1.5. 15 Pursuant to rule 42(b) 
of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered that 
the matters be tried separately. 16 
12 In connection with the promulgation of regulation 2 in June, 1972, forms were 
sent to owners and operators of various air pollution sources, including the City for its 
South Bay Avenue incinerator, to ascertain their status regarding the established emis-
sion limitations. The City's Commissioner of Public Works, by letter dated October 26, 
1972, stated that the applicable limitation was not capable of being achieved by January 
31, 1974, and, therefore, a compliance schedule was being submitted. The City's 
schedule contained a final compliance date of June 1976, although regulation 2 gives 
the DPH authority to order noncomplying sources to submit schedules to achieve com-
pliance not later than July 31, 1975. 8 E.R.C. at 1241-42, 5 E.L.R. at 20713. 
13 !d. at 1242, 5 E.L.R. at 20713. The City did not seek judicial review of this order, 
as permitted by G.L. c. 30A. 
14 Regulation 6.2.1 provides: "No person shall cause, suffer, allow, or permit the 
emission of smoke, fi:om any incinerator, which has a shade density, or appearance 
equal to or greater than No. 1 of the Chart at any time." The "chart" refers to the 
Ringelmann Chart. See note 9 supra. 
15 8 E.R.C. at 1241, 5 E.L.R. at 20713. 
16 !d. 
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In reviewing the enforceability of the DPH's order, the court ad-
dressed three issues: (1) whether the City's failure to seek judicial re-
view of the final order under chapter 30A of the General Laws fore-
closed consideration of any issue other than jurisdiction in the en-
forcement proceeding before the court; (2) whether the DPH had au-
thority to issue an order consisting of a compliance schedule or 
whether the DPH could only order the City to "stop and abate" under 
section 142D of chapter Ill of the General Laws, or to "cease and de-
sist" under section 142E; and (3) if the DPH could issue an order con-
taining a compliance schedule, whether such order could be issued 
without first requiring performance of smokestack gas emission tests, 
as allegedly required by regulation 2.5.3,17 
Regarding the first issue, the court concluded that where a defen-
dant had failed to seek timely judicial review under chapter 30A, the 
only issue in a subsequent proceeding to enforce the order was 
whether the administrative decision was within the agency's 
jurisdiction. 18 The court found that the order was within the DPH's 
jurisdiction because the incinerator was an "air contaminant source" 
under the City's control. 19 
As for the DPH's authority to issue orders containing compliance 
schedules under section 142B, it was the court's opinion that the 
phrase "to stop and abate violation of any rules and regulations" in 
section 142B encompasses the power to order schedules, particularly 
when viewed in the light of the overall federal regulatory scheme 
under the Clean Air Act and the remedial nature of sections 142A 
through 142E.2o 
The third issue addressed by the court was the most significant in 
terms of its potential impact on the DPH's overall enforcement effort, 
since if the court had adopted the City's construction of regulation 
2.5.3,21 the DPH would have had to require costly stack gas emission 
testing in accordance with EPA Test Method number 5 for every 
source prior to issuance of an administrative compliance order. After 
admitting evidence from experts in the field of air pollution control 
and stack gas sampling that indicated that there were other, less 
sophisticated methods to. determine whether an incinerator's smoke-
17 Id. at 1242, 5 E.L.R. at 20713. 
18 /d. at 1243, 5 E.L.R. at 20714 .. 
19 I d. 
20 ld. See Miller, Environmental Law, 1972 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 21.2-.6, at 
578-602, cited in the court's opinion. 
21 Regulation 2.5.3 provides, in part: 
Any emission testing to be compared to these limitations must be conducted under 
isokinetic sampling conditions and in accordance with the method described by 
Subpart E-"Standards of Performance for Incinerators" as specified in the Fed-
eral Register, Volume 36, No. 247, December 23, 1971, or by another method 
which has been correlated to the above method to the satisfaction of the Depart-
ment of Public Health. 
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stack emissions met current air pollution requirements,22 the court 
ruled that the language of regulation 2.5.3 nowhere made any testing 
mandatory and thus would not support the construction advanced by 
the City. It acknowledged the cost of stack gas testing to be high in 
every case, and concluded: 
The clear intent of the regulation is rather to engage in such test-
ing only in those cases where there is no other way to determine 
the compliance or non-compliance of a particular source. In this 
case all the evidence indicates that with respect to the Boston in-
cinerator, no test was net;ded.23 
In its order for judgment, the court found the DPH order valid, 
binding, and enforceable, and further ordered that if its terms were 
not complied with, the incinerator must cease burning any refuse. 24 
Turning to the second portion of the Commissioner's complaint, 
the court first ruled that it had jurisdiction under section 142B25 to 
restrain violations of the DPH's rules and regulations, and found, 26 
after receiving testimonial evidence presented by affected area resi-
dents, a medical expert, and from various admissions of the City and 
its Commissioner of Public Works, that the City was in violation of 
regulations 1,27 6.2.1,28 8.1.3,29 8.1.5,30 and 8.2.2.31 
22 One method was the use of emission factors in accordance with the EPA's AP42 
Air Pollution Engineering Manual. This method is a numerical calculation of emissions 
based on a table of empirically observed calculations. For the subject incinerator, such 
calculations show that it would produce 30 pounds of particulates per ton of material 
burned. If converted to grains/Standard Cubic Foot at 12 percent COz, this would equal 
1.5, or 15 times the .10 grains/SCF at 12 percent COz promulgated in regulation 2.5.3. 
Although the court's finding that no stack tests were required rendered consideration 
of the various tests unnecessary, the court stated that "if relevant, the court infers, 
separately and independently, that the Department has found such calculation methods 
to have been correlated to EPA Method 5, with sufficient reliability." 8 E.R.C. at 1244, 
5 E.L.R. at 20715. 
23 /d. at 1245,5 E.L.R. at 20715. 
24 I d. 
25 I d. 
28 Id. at 1247, 5 E.L.R. at 20716. 
27 See note 10 supra. 
28 See note 14 sti.pra. 
29 Regulation 8.1.3 provides: "No person shall cause, suffer, allow, or permit the 
burning of refuse or any other material in any incinerator in a manner that is not m 
conformance with a Standard Operating Procedure (for the incinerator) that has been 
approved by the Department in writing." 
30 Regulation 8.1.5 provides: "No person shall cause, suffer, allow, or permit the 
burning of refuse or any other material in an incinerator at a specific site location that, 
in the opinion of the Department, is likely to cause or contribute to a condition of air 
pollution and when the person responsible for the operation of the incinerator has 
been notified of said opinion." 
31Regulation 8.2.2 provides: "No person shall cause, suffer, allow or permit the oper-
ation of a municipal incinerator unless said incinerator has complied with the provisions 
of Regulation 2." 
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During the proceedings, the Court received evidence of possible al-
ternative solutions to continued use of the incinerator. Whereas the 
City maintained that its only solution was to construct a new in-
cinerator, which would cost approximately $30,000,000 and require 
several years to construct, the DPH argued that alternative solutions 
to the problem of waste disposal existed. 32 In its findings of fact, the 
court agreed with the DPH, and concluded: 
16. [The court] does not believe that this is a situation of impos-
sibility, or extreme hardship, involving one who has made and is 
making good faith efforts to comply with the law. 
17. On the contrary, the overall picture in this case shows con-
siderable foot-dragging by the City. 
27. The pattern is one of indifference and delay bordering on 
almost deliberate flouting of the law and does not commend itself 
to lenient treatment. 33 
Consequently, on August 1, the court enjoined further operation of 
the incinerator in violation of the cited regulations.34 On August 8, 
1975, the Supreme Judicial Court, having heard argument on the 
City's application for a stay pending appeal, granted a stay of the or-
ders of the superior court to the limited extent necessary to dispose of 
the refuse located at the incinerator as of that date. The limited stay 
expired on August 27, 1975, without further appeal, and the in-
cinerator ceased operations, thereby ending the DPH's four year ef-
fort to resolve this significant air pollution problem. 
§18.15. The Boston Transportation Control Plan. In the 1974 
Survey, 1 the basic principles of transportation control plans ("TCP's") 
and, in particular, the Boston TCP and the South Terminal Corp. v. 
EPA 2 suit challenging the plan were discussed at length. Although in 
South Terminal Corp., the First Circuit upheld the EPA's authority to 
promulgate the TCP for Boston,3 it stayed final compliance with cer-
tain control strategies.4 The court's determination was the result of 
the petitioners' attack on the data base used by the EPA to establish 
the percent reduction in pollutants for the plan.5 The First Circuit 
found that the administrative record of preparation of the original 
plan6 was insufficient to demonstrate that petitioners' technical objec-
32 8 E.R.C. at 1247, 5 E.L.R. at 20716. 
33 Id. at 1248-49, 5 E.L.R. at 20717. 
34 /d. at 1249, 5 E.L.R. at 20717. 
§18.15. 1 O'Brien and Miller, Environmental Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW 
§ 18.14, at 475. 
2 504 F.2d 646, 6 E.R.C. 2025, 4 E.L.R. 20768 (1st Cir. 1974). 
3 /d. at 668, 6 E.R.C. at 2036, 4 E.L.R. at 20776. 
4 /d. at 667, 6 E.R.C. at 2036, 4 E.L.R. at 20775. 
5 /d. at 662-66, 6 E.R.C. at 2032-35, 4 E.L.R. at 20772-75. 
6 38 Fed. Reg. 30960 (1973). 
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tions to the measurements had been adequately considered. 7 The 
court intended that the EPA would use its technical reassessment to 
resolve petitioners' objections and consequently affirm or modify its 
conclusions as to the emission reductions required to be achieved by 
the Boston TCP.8 As a result of this decision, the EPA proposed cer-
tain amendments on February 28, 1975,9 and held public hearings in 
March, 1975, to permit further comment on the technical data pre-
sented in support of the original plan and on recent carbon monoxide 
and photochemical oxidant data collected from the Massachusetts air 
monitoring network. 1 0 
The proposed amendments published in February, 1975, included a 
program that would reduce commuter travel by employees and 
students 11 and would be implemented in co~unction with the 
Commonwealth's carpool matching plan12 and the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority's pass program.13 Also added to the original 
TCP were a provision for limiting overall hydrocarbon emissions from 
major users of organic compounds, 14 a strategy for controlling carbon 
monoxide levels outside the Boston core area, 15 a procedure for the 
periodic monitoring and updating of the plan, 16 and a proposal for 
encouraging bicycle use. 17 In addition, several modifications to exist-
ing provisions were proposed, including limiting on-street commuter 
parking, 18 a ceiling on the level of commercial parking spaces in the 
freeze area,19 and incentives for carpool and transit use. 20 
On June 12, 1975, the EPA promulgated its final amendments for 
the Boston TCP21 after considering comments received during the 
March hearing and written comments submitted in response to the 
February 28, 1975 Federal Register proposals.22 In these final regula-
tions, the EPA eliminated from the original plan requirements for: ( 1) 
vacancy rates established for Boston core area off-street commercial 
parking facilities, (2) building bus and carpool incentives at specifically 
7 504 F.2d at 665, 6 E.R.C. at 2034, 4 E.L.R. at 20774. 
8 /d. at 666, 6 E.R.C. at 2035, 4 E.L.R. at 20775. 
940 Fed. Reg. 8668-81 (1975). 
10 As a part of its data collection program, the EPA conducted an intensive quality 
control program to verify the reliability of the monitoring devices at each site. /d. at 
8668. 
11 /d. at 8678 (proposed § 52.1161). 
12 /d. at 8676 (proposed § 52.1138). 
13 /d. at 8678 (proposed§ 52.1161). 
14 /d. at 8677 (proposed § 52.1145). 
15 /d. at 8680-81 (proposed§ 52.1164). 
16 /d. at 8677 (proposed § 52.1160). 
17 /d. at 8679 (proposed§ 52.1162). 
18 /d. at 8675 (proposed§ 52.1134). 
19 Id. at 8675-76 (proposed§ 52.1135). 
20 Id. at 8676 (proposed§ 52.1139). 
21 Id. at 25152-70. 
22 /d. at 8661-81. 
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identified locations in the highway system, and (3) requirements for 
retrofitting older vehicles with the air bleed and vacuum spark ad-
vance disconnect devices.23 In addition, certain modifications, origi-
nally proposed in February, 1975, were incorporated with minor re-
finements including: (1) limitations on on-street commuter parking,24 
(2) an annual inspection and maintenance program for an idle emis-
sion evaluation,25 (3) incentives for carpool and transit use,26 and (4) 
controls on emissions of organic compounds from stationary 
sources. 27 Finally, the Boston TCP includes proposals for controlling 
carbon monoxide at certain "suburban hot spots" outside the Boston 
core area,28 for periodic monitoring to update the plan,29 and for a 
detailed study leading to comprehensive measures to encourage bicy-
cle use.30 
23 /d. at 25152. 
24 Id. at 25162 (proposed§ 52.1134). 
25 /d. at 25164-65 (proposed§ 52.1140). 
26 Id. at 25164 (proposed§ 52.1139). 
27 Id. at 25165 (proposed§ 52.1145). 
28 I d. at 25170 (proposed § 52.1164). 
29 Id. at 25166 (proposed§ 52.1160). 
30 Id. at 25168-69 (proposed§ 52.1162). 
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